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1 WHY CARE ABOUT THE COMMON LAW AND EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION?
This special issue of the International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and
Industrial Relations focuses on the continuing role of the common law – the
unwritten, judge-made law of the English legal tradition – in the regulation of
employment relationships, notwithstanding the emergence of pervasive statutory
regulation across the common law world. This collection of articles has been
developed from a panel discussion at the Labour Law Research Network
Conference in Amsterdam in June 2015, and the idea for that panel discussion
emerged from some inter-jurisdictional debate about the surprising decision of
the Australian High Court in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. Barker1 at the end
of 2014.
It is odd indeed that a single decision from a peculiar antipodean
jurisdiction should have generated such vigorous debate about the survival of the
common law judicial method in the field of labour law, but it has. This is no
doubt because the decision has been perceived as a full frontal attack on the
acceptance in English jurisprudence of the (until now) uncontroversial
proposition that employment relationships are founded on an expectation of
‘mutual trust and confidence’ between employer and employee. The Barker
decision determined that Australian law did not, and should not, recognize the
‘mutual trust and confidence’ implied term accepted for so long in English
employment contract law.2 The case was probably more surprising to English
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employment law scholars than to most Australian lawyers. Academic opinion in
Australia has been divided for some time on whether this English invention
could pass the necessity test applied in Australian contract law to qualify as a
recognized term implied by law.3
Perhaps more interesting than the outright rejection of mutual trust and
confidence in Barker was the court’s reasoning. A key justification for rejecting
any common law recognition of any mutual obligation of this nature (the court
affirmed that employees continue to owe a duty not to destroy the necessary trust
and confidence in the employment relationship)4 was a conviction that such
‘normative’ developments belonged squarely within the prerogative of
Parliament. It would be an impermissible act of judicial trespass into the
legislature’s territory for a common law court to impose such an obligation on
parties to employment relationships. Of course this assumes that a court
recognizing such a duty would be imposing a standard of behaviour, rather than
merely recognizing the existing mutual undertakings of the parties themselves. So
long as the parties themselves have not explicitly contracted out of any
obligation to deal fairly with each other, it would be an entirely conventional
application of classical contract law principles to recognize as an implied term an
obligation that the parties must be presumed (from the factual matrix of their
relationship) to have voluntarily accepted for themselves. There is ample ancient
authority for the proposition that parties to contracts implicitly agree to ‘do all
such things as are necessary on his part to enable the other party to have the
benefit of the contract’.5 And in the twenty-first century, surely it is not too
great a stretch of the imagination to assume that parties to continuing
employment relationships do in fact expect to deal fairly with each other.
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For example, in Barker, the mutual trust term was called upon to establish
that Mr Barker was entitled to be considered for redeployment before being
made redundant. It was open to the High Court to find (as the Federal Court
majority did) that the confluence of certain facts demonstrated an implicit
agreement that the employer would attempt to redeploy staff before making
them redundant.Those facts were:
(1) a clause in the contract of employment indicating that employees
would receive severance pay on redundancy only if they had not
been redeployed;
(2) a policy document which (although explicitly not contractual) set out
the procedures for redeployment;
(3) the conduct of human resources staff who attempted (unsuccessfully)
to contact Mr Barker with redeployment opportunities.
The court did not need to impose some new moral obligation to reach such
a result. It needed only to assume that the employer did, in fact, intend to give
effect to its own policies and procedures and that this intention formed part of
the bargain between the parties.
The High Court in Barker wasted no words on this question, even though
the earlier decision of the majority in the Federal Court appeal did find for the
employee on the basis of an interpretation of his employment contract.6 The
High Court’s reasoning proceeded on the assumption that any duty not to
destroy mutual trust and confidence must derive from some normative principle,
imposed as a matter of policy on employers regardless of their own intentions.
Since under a strict view of a separation of executive, legislative and judicial
powers, new policy creation belongs in the realm of executive and legislative, but
not judicial authority, the court was unwilling to accept responsibility for
recognizing that the employment relationship may have evolved since master and
servant times. This aspect of the decision raises interesting questions about the
relationship between the common law and statute, and indeed the role of the
common law at all, in the regulation of employment relationships.
2 COHERENCE
‘Coherence’ between the common law and statute has been a particular concern
in employment contract law since the House of Lords decided Johnson v. Unisys
Ltd,7 and created an ‘exclusion zone’ for common law remedies, in a case where
6 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. Barker [2013] FCAFC 83.
7 [2003] 1 AC 518.
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a statute was held to command the field. In Johnson, the House of Lords refused
to allow any damages award for breach of the obligation not to destroy mutual
trust and confidence to outstrip the statutory cap on damages for an unfair
termination of employment. Eastwood v. Magnox Electric plc8 affirmed the finding
in Johnson, and identified an inconvenient distinction between breaches of mutual
trust during employment, which may sound in a common law damages award,
and breaches of mutual trust constituted by the fact or manner of dismissal, in
which case compensation would be limited to any award available under the
statute. This pair of decisions has justified other courts (e.g., in State of NSW v.
Paige9) in refusing to recognize a common law duty where statutory provisions
operate.
Does concern for coherence in the law always require courts exercising
common law jurisdiction to vacate the field whenever a statutory regime
operates? In Edwards v. Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust; Botham
(FC) v. Ministry of Defence10 some members of the court took notice of a
statutory regime imposing obligations of procedural fairness in disciplining staff
when construing the express terms of an employment contract. It was assumed
that the parties included disciplinary procedures in their employment contracts in
order to guide their compliance with statutory requirements, so they must
therefore have intended to be subject to no more than statutory sanctions, should
they breach these procedures. The existence of statutory provisions became part
of the ‘factual matrix’ used to interpret the intentions of the parties to the
contract.The Australian Federal Court has also engaged this kind of reasoning to
find that a human resources policy manual did form part of an employment
contract. The existence of statutory obligations to prevent workplace harassment
was counted as evidence in favour of finding that the promises in the employer’s
policy manual were seriously made, would have significant consequences upon
breach, and were therefore binding on both parties in contract.11
So which is the better view? Is the common law now excluded from any
field where there is a statutory regime mandating obligations and (often)
instituting new forms of adjudication of claims and providing special remedies?
Or has the development over time of new statutory protections for workers
(against such risks as capricious dismissal, or workplace harassment), established
such expectations in parties to employment contracts that the common law
courts ought now to accept that those new norms do form part of the
objectively determined, reasonable expectations of parties to an employment
8 [2005] 1 AC 503.
9 (2002) 60 NSWLR 371.
10 [2011] UKSC 58 (14 Dec. 2011).
11 See Romero v. Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 177.
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contract? In many cases, it seems that the answer to this question will depend
upon whether the presiding judge deems it appropriate to award contract-based
damages for breach of the obligation in question. Contract damages, based as
they are on the principle that the party in breach must pay the price of the
other party’s disappointed expectations, can be significant in a case where an
employee can legitimately claim the loss of an expectation to remain in
employment until scrupulously fair procedures for dismissal have been
followed.12 Where there is an acceptable statutory remedy (as there was in
Johnson), judicial reluctance to award additional compensation is understandable.
Difficulties arise where legislation is silent on a matter. Does this leave a
field open to continued common law development, or is the judicial prerogative
to develop common law principles in line with community values now
constrained by a requirement that common law development must adopt the
principles underpinning cognate statutory developments? May common law
advance into a field untouched by statutory development, or must the
Parliament’s silence be interpreted as unwillingness to permit any legal
development at all in that field? The latter view permits the judiciary to abdicate
their historical common law role completely, and to stand idly by while injustice
prevails in individual cases, for want of a sufficiently omniscient Parliament to
predict all potential new legal disputes. This is the necessary consequence of a
principled stand against what has come to be known as ‘judicial activism’:
litigants in cases involving novel problems must suffer until an issue has garnered
sufficient political interest to motivate legislative action. A great strength of the
common law tradition in the past has been its ability to solve new problems on a
case-by-case basis, even without the benefit of the great civil law codifications.
But on these matters, equally educated minds differ.
In this special issue, Professor Douglas Brodie, noted for his seminal
scholarship on the development of the notion of an obligation of ‘mutual trust
and confidence’, or ‘fair dealing’ in employment contract law in the common law
world, provides an evaluation of the Barker decision, and other recent
developments, to assess the potential future development of obligations of good
faith in employment contract law.13 Underpinning his analysis is considerable
faith in the common law method.
12 See for example a case such as Bostik (Australia) Pty Ltd v. Gorgevski (No 1) (1992) 36 FCR 201,
where an employer was ordered to pay seven years’ salary to an employee as compensation for being
dismissed without the benefit of what was held to be a contractually binding obligation to certain
disciplinary procedures.
13 D. Brodie, The Dynamics of Common Law Evolution, 32 (1) Intl. J. Comp.Lab. L. & Indus. Rel. 45
(2016).
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Claire Mummé has contributed a note on a recent Canadian decision,
Bhasin v. Hrynew,14 and assesses its potential for engendering clear obligations of
good faith performance in employment contracts.15
Gabrielle Golding’s article in this issue is less enthusiastic about trusting the
judiciary and common law development with the evolution of laws so important
as those determining worker’s rights.16 She weighs the relative merits of relying
on judge-made or statutory law in regulating employment, testing each approach
against the values of democratic legitimacy in law-making and procedural
efficiency. Her conclusions propose a compromise position, with Parliament
determining a model set of default terms for employment contracts, to be
interpreted and applied in individual cases by the common law courts. While
ever the courts play any role in determining disputes over the bargains between
employers and employees, there will be a need for the occasional resort to
implied terms.
There is merit in the view (also expressed by Gordon Anderson) that the
common law’s conservative tendency to privilege property rights and the sanctity
of contracts has meant that modern innovations favouring the interests of
ordinary working people have come about not through judicial activism but as a
consequence of statutory intervention in the labour market – either through
statutes supporting rights to collective bargaining, or directly legislated
protections for employees. Even the implied term of mutual trust and confidence
recognized in English law was engendered from the perceived need to ensure
that new statutory protections were not undermined by perverse employer
conduct.17
Anderson’s article presents a strong argument for regulation of employment
relationships by specialist labour tribunals rather than common law courts, based
on the experience of changing regulatory regimes in New Zealand.18 The
common law played a limited role in the years before the 1980s, when New
Zealand industrial relations were governed largely by a collectivist arbitration
system. The deregulation of that system under the influence of a neoliberal
political regime enabled a shift towards reliance on judicial determination of
employment disputes according to the common law values of individualism,
freedom of contract, and protection of the property rights of employers. As
14 2014 SCC 71.
15 C. Mummé, Bhasin v. Hrynew: A New Era for Good Faith in Canadian Employment Law, or just
Tinkering at the Margins?, 32 (1) Intl. J. Comp.Lab. L. & Indus. Rel. 117 (2016).
16 See G. Golding, The Role of Judges in the Regulation of Australian Employment Contracts, 32 (1) Intl. J.
Comp.Lab. L. & Indus. Rel. 69 (2016).
17 M. Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract 155 (2003).
18 G. Anderson, The Common Law and the Reconstruction of Employment Relationships in New Zealand, 32
(1) Intl. J. Comp. Lab. L. & Indus. Rel. 93 (2016).
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Anderson demonstrates, through an analysis of some key decisions, judicial
adherence to these values has resulted in stronger support for employer interests,
and limited the development in New Zealand law of any genuine obligation of
‘mutual trust and confidence’ in employment relationships. Anderson concludes
that ‘the greater the degree of autonomy given to specialist labour courts ... the
greater the likelihood that they will develop the law in a way that is more
sympathetic to a bipartite approach’.19
3 WHY NOT GO ALL THE WAY?
If there is such an appetite to defer completely to statutory regulation of all
matters affecting labour rights and obligations, one wonders what role remains
for the common law contract of employment. Is contract a useful conceptual
tool at all in employment regulation? Perhaps this ‘figment of the legal
imagination’20 is now well and truly past its use-by date in the statute-heavy
field of labour market regulation. This author has argued elsewhere21 that a legal
model based – philosophically and practically – on the enforcement of
voluntarily assumed obligations does not suit the resolution of contemporary
employment disputes. So many terms and conditions of employment are now
mandated by either statute or instruments made under statute without the
necessity of establishing the consent of the parties. For many decades,
contemporary western industrial societies have implicitly recognized that the
employment relationship is not uniformly a relationship between autonomous
actors with equal freedom to choose their contract partner and bargain for
terms. Many jurisdictions have enacted extensive regulation to control maximum
working hours, minimum wages and entitlements to various forms of leave.
Employers bear many mandatory obligations (for instance, under discrimination
statutes) that constrain their freedom in recruitment and dismissal. Job security
legislation, imposing obligations upon employers to refrain from unfair (or ‘harsh,
unjust and unreasonable’22) dismissal has been most influential in recent decades
in eroding any similarity between employment and other commercial contracts
under which work is performed. Australian unfair dismissal legislation23 permits
19 Ibid.
20 See O. Kahn Freund, Labour and the Law 1–17 (P. Davies & M. Freedland eds, 3d ed., Stevens 1983);
S. Deakin, The Many Futures of the Contract of Employment, in Labour Law in an Era of Globalisation (J.
Conaghan, R.M. Fischl & K. Klare eds, Oxford University Press 2002).
21 J. Riley, Beyond Contract: Reconceptualising the Fundamentals of the Law of Work, Paper presented at the
LLRN Conference in Barcelona, June 2013.
22 This is the formulation of words used in Australian legislation: see the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s.
385.
23 See the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) Pt 3-2.
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an arbitral tribunal to order reinstatement of an unfairly dismissed employee,
much to the annoyance of employer lobby groups who lament the loss of a
freedom to hire and fire at will. So in many jurisdictions, there is no unfettered
freedom to contract when the kind of contract contemplated describes an
employment relationship.
Employers themselves often elect to eschew contract in determining
conditions of employment, preferring instead to govern workplaces and work
practices by means of fluid, non-contractual workplace policies. The contention
in Barker concerned a workplace policy governing employees’ entitlement to seek
redeployment before being dismissed for redundancy. An express stipulation in
the human resources manual containing the policy included a statement
asserting: ‘The Manual is not in any way incorporated as part of any industrial
award or agreement entered into by the Bank, nor does it form any part of an
employee’s contract of employment’.24 This statement was held to be effective to
relieve the bank of any obligation to honour its own policies. If employers
themselves are resorting to forms of governance that assert managerial prerogative
in all matters not already determined by statute when settling employment
arrangements, where is the role for contract law in governing ordinary working
relationships?
A common reaction to this idea is scepticism. Of course, say the detractors,
employment must be a contract. Any other conception of the relationship
countenances slavery. Not so. Just because the relationship must be initiated by a
voluntary act does not mean that the on-going dealings between the parties must
be governed by the principles of commercial contract law. Our legal system
recognizes many voluntary relationships that are not regulated by the principles
of commercial contract law. Marriage, for instance, no longer succumbs to
contract principles when disputes arise, although we may still occasionally speak
of the ‘marriage contract’. Many who continue to refer to the ‘employment
contract’ are describing a special category of ‘employment contract law’ which
has departed in many important respects from classical contract law principles.
For example, in the employment context, we readily accept that terms may be
ambulatory, to allow for the exercise of ‘managerial prerogative’ and flexibility,
without destruction of the underpinning commitment to the relationship.
Organizational behaviour theorists describe this kind of relationship as a
‘psychological contract’.25 The psychological contract describes the employment
relationship as a cooperative endeavour, based on certain explicit and implicit
24 Barker, [283].
25 See C. George, The Psychological Contract: Managing and Developing Professional Groups (Open
University Press McGraw-Hill 2009). See also K. van Wezel Stone, From Widgets to Digits:
Employment Regulation for the Changing Workplace 88–92 (Cambridge University Press 2004).
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expectations of how parties will mutually benefit from the relationship, and how
they will adapt the terms of their bargain over time, generally in the interests of
accommodating the business needs of the employer. For a lawyer, the use of the
word ‘contract’ in this context is misleading because the nature of the
relationship loosely described by the ‘psychological contract’ does not conform
to the precepts of classical contract law. When parties to this ‘psychological
contract’ experience a relationship breakdown, and their dispute ends up in a
courtroom, the application of the hard principles of commercial contract law,
which purport to hold parties only to the original terms of their formal bargain,
can produce results which defeat the expectations engendered by the
‘psychological’ contract. My argument is that, in these circumstances, the
vocabulary of ‘contract’ is apt to mislead and disappoint the expectations of the
parties. If employment relationships really do depend upon principles other than
the enforcement of sufficiently certain and serious bargains, would we not be
better off developing a new vocabulary which better reflects those true
principles? The big question is, which common law principles, if any, adequately
describe the reality of employment relationships, and could usefully be engaged
to frame the mutual responsibilities of employment and resolve employment
relationship problems?
4 EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
Jill Murray has proposed an appropriation of the equitable doctrines deriving
from the old English courts of Chancery.26 She proposes, somewhat ambitiously,
that the concept of the fiduciary obligation ought to inform the development of
employers’ obligations to their workers. Unlike contract law, which assumes
equally matched autonomous parties who enjoy a freedom to pursue their own
selfish interests, fiduciary law assumes that one party accepts an obligation to
sacrifice his or her own interests to those of a beneficiary. Employees are often
held to be fiduciaries when they occupy positions of trust, and are capable of
affecting the property rights of their employers. Employees can be required to
account back to employers for profits made from opportunities arising out of
their employment. But employers never owe fiduciary duties to employees, not
unless an employer finds itself in possession of property that belongs (in equity)
to the employee, and that will be a rare fact situation. Employers will never owe
fiduciary duties to employees, because the very nature of the underlying
economic relationship is that the employer seeks to exploit the labour power of
26 See J. Murray, Conceptualising the Employer as Fiduciary: Mission Impossible?, in The Autonomy of Labour
Law 337 (Bogg et al. ed., Hart 2015).
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the worker (in the sense that the employer calculates upon paying less in wages
than the value of the work). Employers do not engage workers as an act of
charity. They expect to profit from the arrangement. The fiduciary principle is
completely inept to describe such a relationship.
Some years ago, Paul Finn identified a schema of three broad standards
applicable to the regulation of consensual relationships: the fiduciary principle,
the good faith principle, and the unconscionability principle.27 Because the
fiduciary principle commands a self-sacrificing commitment to service of the
other, it will never describe the relationship of an employer to an employee. To
try to make it do so is to attack the fundamental definition of the fiduciary
concept. Nevertheless, the other two principles may have a role to play. The
unconscionability principle requires parties – even those acting legitimately with
self-interest – to refrain from exploiting a known special disadvantage of the
other. The unconscionability principle controls the most egregious opportunism
and already operates as an equitable constraint in commercial (and hence also
employment) contract law, but generally only as a means of vitiating, or escaping,
an exploitative contract. Employees who have been the victim of exploitative
contracts will generally not benefit from rescission of the contract. They do not
need to escape the contract entirely: they need fairer terms. The weakness with
the unconscionability principle, while it remains an equitable principle limited to
equitable remedies, is that it does not guarantee fairer terms. Some jurisdictions
have enacted statutory regimes to permit a broader range of more useful
remedies for unconscionable conduct. For example, the prohibitions on
unconscionable dealing in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth),
Australian Consumer Law Schedule, section 22, can be enforced by an order for
variation of the offending contract terms.28 Again, we see the necessity for
statutory intervention to do better justice than is available under the common
law, even assisted by equity.
Finn’s good faith principle is a more promising concept, because the good
faith principle recognizes that parties to a joint endeavour owe mutual
obligations to cooperate, notwithstanding that each is permitted to regard their
own interest in the bargain. The good faith principle, however, is not strictly an
equitable doctrine, but a borrowing from the civil law’s approach to contract.
Douglas Brodie’s article in this issue considers the scope for development of the
good faith principle in employment law.
27 P.D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, in Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 3 (T.G.Youdan ed., Carswell 1989).
28 See Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s. 87.
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5 TORT LAW AND THE CONCEPT OF A ‘DUTY OF CARE’
Another common law concept that may be put to use in employment regulation
is the concept of a duty of care in tort. The law of tort side-steps the
preoccupation of contract law with voluntarily assumed duties, and demands
compliance with those standards of conduct that a civilised community expects
of its members. Is the employment relationship more appropriately regulated by
the underpinning principles of tort law and its imposition of duties of care
towards those whose lives are sufficiently connected to our own? Certainly tort
law has played an important role in developing the mutual duties of care owed
by employers and employees in the course of their engagements, but it has
focussed principally on protection of workers from physical, and more recently
psychological harm, and to some extent, reputational harm.29 Tort law is
reluctant to usurp the territory of pure economic harm. So while we have
developed the employer’s duty not to bring the employee into foreseeable risk of
unnecessary harm, the conception of harm does not presently extend to the
harm of penury arising from a capricious dismissal. While we continue to treat
employment as a contractual relationship, it is unlikely (in the extreme) that a
court exercising common law jurisdiction would be willing to develop remedies
in tort for capricious dismissal, in the face of a contract that already purports to
deal with termination of employment. In Australia, the High Court has already
held that it will not be a breach of a tortious duty of care for an employer to
insist upon its rights under an employment contract.30 If we were to abandon
the notion that employment relationships must conform to the principles of
contract law, there may be room to develop the notion that an employer owes a
duty of care towards employees not to cause unnecessary risk of economic harm
by capricious treatment. While tort law may provide the essential principle, it is
more likely that such developments will come through statutory intervention.
Even in the field of physical workplace safety, statutory developments have
been more effective in addressing risks for workers. For many decades,
occupational health and safety statutes have provided forms of regulation geared
towards the prevention of workplace harm. Statutes empowering inspectorates to
monitor compliance with safety laws make infinitely more sense than reliance on
a long-delayed ex post facto determination by a court that someone breached a
duty of care and should now be required to compensate the victim for the harm
suffered.
29 See Spring v. Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 296.
30 See Koehler v. Cerebos (Australia) Ltd (2005) 222 CLR 44.
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6 CONCLUSION
There will always be a role for judges in interpreting statutes and applying them
to resolve disputes in particular fact scenarios. The broader question is, how far
does the judicial role extend? Can we expect judicial development of a broad
obligation to cooperate ‘in good faith’, even absent statutory fiat? Douglas
Brodie’s article illuminates this question. Claire Mummé’s note on Bhasin v.
Hrynew31 suggests there is some hope for common law development of a duty of
good faith performance in employment, if Canadian precedent is found to be
persuasive in other parts of the common law world. However, if the Barker
decision of the Australian High Court proves influential, those of us who
earnestly desire the development of more egalitarian labour laws will need to
direct our attention to the lobbying of parliaments. Perhaps that is the better
solution. As Gordon Anderson’s article explains, history tells that the common
law has a poor record for protecting employees.
31 2014 SCC 71.
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